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RECENT DECISIONS
and Mine Workers fall within this definition, yet they have been upheld
by the Supreme Court. Since these methods of practicing law are con-
stitutionally protected, does it follow that they are ethical? Will they
help to increase public confidence in the legal profession? The Supreme
Court has not specifically answered these questions in the affirmative;
rather, it has said that such methods cannot be prohibited. It is clear,
nevertheless, that the trend is to narrow "unauthorized" practice of law
by a qualified attorney, and the canons of professional ethics must be
revised to set realistic guidelines for the future scope of authorized
practice.
JAMES P. MURPHY, JR.
INCOME TAXATION - INCORPORATED PROFESSIONAL GROUP TREATED AS A
CORPORATION FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES.-On November 1, 1965, taxpayer,
an attorney, became owner of 10 per cent of the stock in the incorporated'
law firm for which he worked. Subsequently he filed a claim for a tax
refund on that portion of the 10 per cent of the corporation's net earn-
ings for the last two months of 1965 which had not been paid to him in
salary during those two months.2 The United States argued that, despite
a corporate charter, a Treasury Regulation defined such a corporation
to be a partnership and consequently all earnings had to be taxed
directly to the individual.3 The District Court held: (1) Treasury Regula-
tions providing that professional organizations, incorporated or un-
incorporated, could not be taxed as a corporation unless the corporate
characteristics were such that the organization more nearly resembled
a corporation than a partnership were an invalid exercise of a non-
delegable legislative function. (2) Even if the Treasury Regulations
were valid, the professional organization more nearly resembled a
corporation than a partneTship. Empey v. United States, 272 F.Supp. 851
(D.Colo. 1967).
For the purposes of federal taxation all business organizations are
classified as either partnerships 4 or corporations. 5 Consequently, the
definitions of these terms must necessarily be broad enough to accom-
modate those organizations which are neither strictly a partnership nor
a corporation. A partnership includes ". . . a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization."6 A corporation in-
'Rule 265, Colo. R. of Civ. Proc.
2The report of the instant case does not contain a summary of facts. Such a summary
may be found in 27 J. Tax. at 270.
4Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965).
'INT. REV. CODE of 1945, § 7701 (a)(2).
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a)(3).
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eludes ". . . associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies."'7
These definitions have remained substantially the same for over thirty
years.8 During this period certain policies have developed which give
some aid in determining into which of these categories a business or-
ganization belongs. A corporate charter, unless it is a sham,9 is usually
determinative in classifying an organization as a corporation.'" An asso-
ciation, which is classified with corporations by the Revenue Code, is
an unincorporated organization with characteristics similar to a cor-
poration. Since this is a matter of degree, some difficulty has arisen
concerning the degree of similarity necessary for corporate classifica-
tion. Morrissey v. Commissioner" established the accepted rule for de-
termining what organizations would be classified as "associations." The
court said, "the inclusion of associations with corporations implies
resemblance but it is resemblance and not identity."'1 2 In determining
whether this "Resemblance" test had been met the court listed certain
common corporate characteristics: (1) an entity capable of holding
legal title, (2) embarked on a corporate undertaking, (3) with central-
ized management, (4) continuity of existence, (5) free transferability
of interests without affecting the continuity of the enterprise, and (6)
limitation of personal liability to the property invested in the enter-
prise.13
After Morrissey, professional organizations were classified as asso-
ciations if they met the "Resemblance" test. Ironically, the government
was the first to argue that professional groups could be classified as
"associations." In Pelton v. Commissioner'4 the government was successful
in having a group of physicians, organized as a business trust, classified
as a corporation even though the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that
physicians could not incorporate. 5 No essential difference was found
between a professional association and a business association. Thus,
the income resulting from the group's professional services could be
taxed twice: first as corporate and then as personal income. With the
realization that they were to be taxed as corporations, professional
groups decided to use this result to their advantage. A group of Mon-
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
'The same definition of a partnership is found in the REVENUE ACT of 1926. BARTON &
BROWNING, FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE TAX LAWS CORRELATED AND ANNOTATED 465(8th ed. 1930), citing REVENUE ACT of 1926 § 2(a)(2), ch. 27, 44 Stat.
The corporate definition dates back at least to 1932. BARTON & BROWNING, supra, at
465, citing REVENUE ACT of 1932, § 1111(a)(3), ch. 209, 47 Stat. 169.
OGregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
"Knoxville Truck Sales & Serv., Inc., 10 T.C. 616 (1948); Cf. Moline Properties, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Burnett v. Commonwealth Improvement, 287
U.S. 415 (1932).
"-296 U.S. 344 (1935). See also Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Swanson v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman Gilbert Associates, 296
U.S. 369 (1935).
"Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 357.
3Id. at 359.
"82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1963).
"People v. United Medical Service, 362 Il. 442, 200 N.E..157 (1936).
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tana physicians organized in the form of a common law association to
avoid personal taxation on a pension reserve fund established for the
member doctors.16 Faced with this move, the government changed its
position and argued, "that because of the nature of the relationship
between doctor and patient and lawyer and client they cannot by or-
ganizing or incorporating achieve the status of a corporation for federal
tax purposes."17 In deciding in favor of the doctors, the court rejected
the government's argument and distinguished an earlier case18 which had
accepted such an argument.
Again in 1959 a group of Texas physicians succeeded in being taxed
as an "association." 19 The court dismissed the government's argument
against such a result as a tactic to increase tax revenue and ruled that
the case could be "stated and determined under elementary principles
of justice. '20
In Foreman v. United States 21 a group of Florida physicians were
classified as a corporation for tax purposes although they were not
allowed to incorporate in that state. The court decided that the group
had all the characteristics listed in the Morrissey "Resemblance" test,
and cited the Pelton, Kintner and Galt cases as precedent for not deviating
from Morrissey even though professional associations were involved.
This series of decisions recognized two policies established by the
Treasury Department through its regulations: state law was of no
importance in determining whether an association sufficiently resembled
a corporation ;22 and doubtful organizations were classified as corpora-
tions.2 3 In order to change these policies and contain the proliferation
of professional associations, the Treasury Department issued new regu-
lations in 196024 which emphasized the importance of local law5 2 and
began a trend to sweep all doubtful associations into the partnership
16Kintner v. United States, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
lInstant case at 852.
"Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir 1963). The court held
that an association of harbor pilots could not be taxed as a corporation for two rea-
sons. First, pilotage was a business in which the pilot became the agent of the owner
of the vessel who was responsible to third persons for the pilot's negligence. Second,
the association could not be an independent contractor because it owned no property
and had no income as an entity. Supra at 697. In distinguishing this case the court in
Kintner said, "by contrast, the Montana doctors are employed by the Association
which receives the fees for services rendered by them to patients. It owns the equip-
ment and apparatus necessary for the practice of medicine. The hours and the working
conditions of the doctors are fixed by the Association, as is also the vacation time.
The compensation they receive comes not from. the patients, but from the salaries
paid to them by the Association and a certain percentage of the profits in accordance
with the agreement. United States v. Kintner, supra note 16, at 424.
"Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
"'Id. at 361.
m232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
'Treas. Reg. 86, art. 801-1 (1935).
'This tendency is summarized in Morrissey v. Commissioner, supra note 12, at 354-55.
See also SCALLEN, FEDERAL INCOME (19....).
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to 11 (1960).
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category.28 These new regulations demanded that a majority of the
unique corporate characteristics exist before an organization could be
classified as an "association. 2 7 In effect, these regulations would have
denied corporate classification to any organization existing in a state
having the Uniform Partnership Act.28 Most states reacted by passing
enabling legislation permitting professional groups to incorporate. 29 To
neutralize the effect of incorporation the Treasury Department amended
the 1960 regulations in 1965.30 These amended regulations deviated
further from established policy by announcing that "the labels applied
by local law to organizations which may now or hereafter be authorized
by local law, are in and of themselves of no importance in the classifica-
tion of such organization."' Furthermore, the 1965 amended regulations
contained a special section which defined professional associations par-
ticularly.3 2  These new regulations emphasized any slight difference
resulting from local law, agreements, legal relationship of the-members
among themselves and with the public, and ethics of the professional
group, and then magnified that slight difference into a rule compelling
classification as a partnership.
The 1960 regulations had been neutralized by state legislation.
The 1965 amended regulations were neutralized by the court in the
instant case. This was accomplished in two ways. First, the court said
the regulations were an invalid usurpation of the legislative function.3
Second, the court said that even if the regulations were valid the Colo-
rado legal organization conformed to the standards of the regulations.3 4
The court said the regulations were invalid for two reasons. First,
they disregard local incorporation. The court reasoned that the In-
ternal Revenue Code's definition of a partnership necessarily excluded
incorporated organizations. "An examination of the foregoing definition
2SCALLEN, supra note 23 at 675.
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a) (1960).
'In emphasizing local law, the 1960 regulations made it impossible for a partnership
in a state having the Uniform Partnership Act to sufficiently change its nature so
as to acquire continuity of life, centralization of management and limited liability.
An agreement for the partnership to continue for a stated period of time which
would be sufficient to vest it with continuity of life would be inoperative since the
Uniform Partnership Act allows a partner to dissolve the partnership despite this
agreement. See REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 63-503(2). The partnership
could not centralize its management since the Act provides that "all partners have
equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business." See RE-
VISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 63-301(e). Neither could any agreement limit
the partners' joint and several liability so as to acquire limited liability. See REVISED
CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 63-207.
Professor Scallen believes that the Kintner regulations of 1960 dealt effectively
with the problem of local law. SCALLEN, supra note 23, at 716.
'There now appear, to be 35 such states. See Goldberg, What's New in Professional
Corporations. Bus. LAWYER ........ (1967). For applicable Montana statutes see RE-
VISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 15-2101 to 15-2116.
3°Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-2 (1965).
t Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
'Instant case at 853.
'Instant case at 854.
[Vol. 29
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refers only to 'unincorporated organizations.' By this definition 'in-
corporated' organizations are necessarily excluded. '35 Such reasoning
is in conformity with the long-accepted policy to respect the state dis-
cretion in issuing a corporate charter.36 Secondly, the court said the
Treasury's interpretative regulations were invalid because they did not
reflect the case law which had applied the Morrissey "Resemblance" test
to professional organizations and had classified groups similar to that in
the instant case as associations. The court concluded, "there appears
to be no case law to the contrary and Congress has not seen fit to take
any legislative action to repudiate this uniform and long-standing judi-
cial construction of the statute.
37
Although the court's holding that the regulations were invalid was
based on traditional rules of statutory construction and controlling
case law, its second reason for attacking the 1965 regulations was not
as sound. In holding that the Colorado organization could qualify as
an association under the 1965 regulations,38 the court ignored these regu-
lations in three ways. First, the court disregarded the regulations'
policy to consider only unique corporate characteristics 39 by taking
into consideration the fact that the organization had associates and was
engaged in a business enterprise for profit.40 Both of these traits "are
generally common to both corporations and partnerships. '41 Secondly,
the court considered the organization's corporate charter as conferring
some of the needed characteristics. 42 This was done despite the mandate
in the regulations that, "the labels applied by local law to organiza-
tions . . . are in and of themselves of no importance in the classification
of such organizations for the purpose of taxation under the Internal
Revenue Code."'43 Thirdly, the court ignored many of the special re-
quirements for continuity of life,44 centralization of management, 45 and
free transferability of interests46 under the regulations.
A strict application of the 1965 regulations would have called for
another result for at least three reasons. Under the 1965 regulations
a professional organization could not have continuity of life if "local
law, applicable regulations or professional ethics do not permit a
member of a professional service organization to share in its profits
unless an employment relationship exists between him and the organiza-
RId.
'Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
8'Instant case at 853.
38Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(1965.
'9Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2)(1965).
"'Instant case at 854.
"Supra note 39.
"Instant case at 854.
"'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(2)(1965).
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (3) (1965).
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tion . . . . ","7 This requirement is based on the premise that the "interest
of a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation includes the right
to share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not legally
dependent upon his participation in the production of the corporation's
income. "48 Consequently, the Treasury Department reasoned that pro-
fessional corporations had to have the same divisibility between owner-
ship of stock and participation in the production of the corporate income.
However, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provided that members
of a legal corporation with certain exceptions had to be actively en-
gaged in the practice of law in the office of the corporation. 49
Secondly, the group in the instant case did not have free transfer-
ability of interests as defined by the regulations. The regulations
provided that
... if a member of a professional service organization who posesses
such an interest may transfer it to a qualified person who is not a
member of the organization only after having first offered his
interest to the other members of the organization at its fair market
value, the corporate characteristics of free transferability does not
exist.50
Since the members of the organization in the instant case could sell
their interest only if the other members did not want to purchase it,
this organization did not have the requisite elements of free transfer-
ability as defined by the regulations.
Thirdly, the group in the instant case did not satisfy the regulations'
requirements for centralization of management. Although the organiza-
tion did have a board of directors with considerable power, 1 the 1965
regulations provided that a professional corporation could not have
centralization of management where a member retained traditional pro-
fessional responsibility. 52  Colorado law specifically provided, "nothing
in these Rules shall be deemed to diminish or change the obligation of
each attorney employed by the corporation to conduct his practice in
accordance with the standards of professional conduct promulgated by
this court . . . . 53
Limited liability seems to be the only unique corporate character-
istic, as defined by the regulations, which this organization did have.
The regulations provided that limited liability did not exist "if under
47Supra note 43.
"Id.
"Rule 265 I(D), Colo. R?. of Civ. Proc.
WSupra note 45.
51Supra note 2. The Board of Directors had control over the kinds of cases and clients
to be accepted, the assignment of individual cases and clients, the amount of the fees,
the professional policies of the association, the procedure and types of records to be
kept, and the compensation to be paid both professional and non-professional em-
ployees.
52Supra note 44.
Rule 265 II(C), Colo. R. of Civ. Proe.
[Vol. 29
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local law and the rules pertaning to professional practice, a mutual
agency relationship . . . exists between the members of a professional
service organization .... -54 Colorado law provides that such a relation-
ship does not exist during a period when the professional corporation
maintained professional liability insurance which the group in the instant
case did.55
The importance of the instant case lies in its first method of neutral-
izing the 1965 regulations - ruling them an invalid exercise of the
legislative function. The difference between legislation and legitimate
interpretation in many instances is one of degree, and consequently it
is sometimes hard to make the distinction. But here the applicable
Treasury regulations seem clearly to have passed beyond the field of
interpretation.
Already the instant case has received approval from the Ohio District
Court which ruled the regulations concerning professional associations
invalid both on the grounds that they ignored the corporate charter of
the organization and that they were not consistent with either judicial
precedent or sound tax policy.56
Before the Second World War the medical and legal professions were
usually organized in small partnerships. But as the population began
to flow towards the urban centers and the need for specialization grew,
professional men realized the need for group practice and organized in
corporate-like structures including business trusts and common law
associations.5" In Pelton58 the government recognized this change in or-
ganization and taxed such groups as corporations. If these groups
decided to offset the loss resulting from corporate taxation by estab-
lishing pension and profit-sharing plans and if eventually the states
adapted their corporate codes to accommodate these groups, the federal
government should respect these decisions.
THOMAS A. HARNEY
JOINT TORTFEASORS: CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN CONCUR-
RENTLY NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS DENIED.-Plaintiff was injured in a col-
lision between an automobile in which he was a passenger and a truck
driven by defendant. Defendant sought to implead the driver of the
automobile alleging he was grossly negligent and should be liable to
defendant for any judgment plaintiff recovered. Held, defendant had
'Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4)(1965).
'Rule 265 I(G), Colo. R. of Civ. Proe.
'O'Neil v. United States, 68-1 USTC (1968).
'Ray, The "New Look" For Professional Corporations and Associations, 51 A.B.A.J.
882 (1965).
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